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Abstract. This article analyzes some of the challenges that can arise when patent law is applied to the ﬁeld
of veterinary medicine. Topics covered in this article include an overview of the different kinds of
inventions that can be patented in the veterinary ﬁeld; a review of recent legal developments that may
affect the patenting of veterinary pharmaceuticals; a discussion of some potential issues related to patents
covering assays; and an identiﬁcation of some special situations where the law affecting veterinary
pharmaceuticals is actually different from the law affecting human pharmaceuticals.
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INTRODUCTION
This article highlights issues that can arise when patent
law is applied to the ﬁeld of veterinary medicine. For the
most part, the application of patent law to veterinary
pharmaceuticals parallels its application to human pharma-
ceuticals, with outcomes dependent on the particular facts in
each case. In a few areas, however, the law itself is different
for veterinary products; and these speciﬁc exceptions—in
areas such as “patent term restoration” and “safe harbor
uses”—are discussed in the ﬁnal section of this article.
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE FUNDAMENTALS
OF PATENT LAW
What is a Patent?
A patent is a governmental grant of a temporary right to
exclude others from making, using, or selling the claimed
invention for a limited number of years. As a policy matter,
the grant of a patent is sometimes viewed as a quid pro quo,
whereby innovation is advanced through full disclosure of a
useful invention in exchange for the grant of exclusive rights
for the life of the patent. For innovators, the possibility of an
exclusive right provides an incentive to invest in research and
development. For the public, the full disclosure of inventions
in published patent documents expands the general knowl-
edge base and leads to further innovations.
What Kinds of Inventions can be Patented in the Field
of Veterinary Medicine?
Subject matter that is amenable to patent protection in the
areas of animal health and veterinary medicine can include:
& A new active ingredient and its use;
& A new process for making an active ingredient
(regardless whether the compound is “old” or
“new”);
& A new form, formulation, or “dosage form” of an old
active ingredient;
& A new use of an old active ingredient (e.g., a new
indication, new species, new patient subgroup, new
dosage regimen, new route of administration, etc.);
& A new combination or mixture of old active
ingredients;
& A new vaccine;
& A newly isolated or puriﬁed substance;
& A novel isolate from the ﬁeld;
& Genetically engineered microorganisms, recombinant
nucleic acids, polypeptides, recombinant vectors, and
transformed cell lines;
& Transgenic animals (e.g., knockout mice, oncogenic
mice, etc.);
& Monoclonal antibodies, hybridomas;
& Screening assays for identifying new active ingredients;
& Assays for measuring an animal’s traits, or the efﬁcacy
or safety of drugs after administration to an animal;
& Methods of diagnosis;
& New devices or packaging;
& New methods of doing business;
& Software; and
& Microchips for implantation.
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The major requirements for obtaining a patent are
summarized brieﬂy below:
1. Statutory Subject Matter — The subject matter sought
to be patented must be of the type that is eligible for
patent protection as a matter of law under the
applicable patent statute in each jurisdiction. (See list
above for examples in the veterinary ﬁeld under U.S.
law).
2. Utility — The invention must be useful and have real
world utility; its use must be speciﬁc, substantial and
credible.(1,2) (The utility requirement is not usually
an issue in the veterinary ﬁeld).
3. Novelty — The invention must be truly new, and
cannot have existed beforehand.(3)
4. Non-obviousness — It is not enough for a new
invention to be novel—it must also be “non-obvious”
to a person having “ordinary skill in the art.”(4)I n
many foreign jurisdictions, the corresponding patent-
ability requirement is referred to as “inventive step”.
See, e.g., Article 56 of the European Patent Convention.
(5)
5. Sufficiency of the Disclosure in the Patent Specifica-
tion as Filed — U.S. Patent law requires that patent
applications disclose the best mode for carrying out
the claimed invention and provide adequate written
description of how to make and use the invention.
With regard to the adequacy of a patent application’s
written description of how to make and use the
invention, contemporary case law in the U.S. high-
lights two signiﬁcant tests. The more classic of the two
is what is often referred to as “enablement”—this is
the more technologically-based test of whether one of
ordinary skill in the art could make and use the
claimed invention without “undue experimentation”.
The other major test of adequate disclosure in the
U.S. is often referred to as the “written description”
requirement. This test is focused on factors such as
whether the inventors have shown, through their
patent speciﬁcation (in sufﬁcient wording and detail),
that they are truly “in possession” of the invention as
claimed.(6)
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW RELATING
TO “SUFFICIENCY OF DISCLOSURE”
THAT COULD AFFECT PATENTING IN THE FIELD
OF VETERINARY MEDICINE
Brief Overview of the Requirements Related to Sufficient
Disclosure
In the U.S., the law pertaining to sufﬁcient disclosure is
codiﬁed in 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1, which provides that:
The speciﬁcation shall contain a written description of
the invention, and of the manner and process of making
and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms
as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains... to make and use the same, and shall set forth
the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying
out his invention.
As indicated above, two major aspects of the Section 112
criteria for sufﬁcient disclosure (the requirements relating to
“enablement” and “written description”) are the subject of
recent developments in the case law in this area and also
present interesting issues for the ﬁeld of veterinary medicine,
especially regarding the question of how broad a claim one
can obtain when only a very limited number of examples (or
species) are disclosed.
The Enablement Requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 112
In the U.S., the standard for evaluating enablement is
whether the patent speciﬁcation teaches those skilled in the
relevant art to make and use the claimed invention without
“undue experimentation”(7). With regard to the factors to be
considered in determining whether “undue experimentation”
is required, reference is usually made to the landmark case of
In re Wands, 858 F. 2nd 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In the Wands
case, the patent claims at issue related to immunoassay
methods for the detection of hepatitis B surface antigens
using high-afﬁnity IgM monoclonal antibodies, and the issue
was whether undue experimentation would have been
required to produce the monoclonal antibodies. The patent
applicant asserted that his invention was enabled because the
monoclonal antibodies needed to perform the immunoassays
could “easily be made from readily available starting
materials using methods that are well known in the mono-
clonal antibody art”(8). The court agreed and noted that
there was no challenge to applicant’s contention that the
starting materials (mice, HBsAg antigen and myeloma cells)
were available to the public. Most importantly for future
cases, the court set forth the following eight factors to
consider in determining whether “undue experimentation”
would be needed:
1. The quantity of experiments necessary;
2. The amount of direction or guidance presented;
3. The presence or absence of working examples;
4. The nature of the invention;
5. The state of the prior art;
6. The relative skill of those in the art;
7. The predictability or unpredictability in the relevant
ﬁeld;
8. The breadth of the claims.
The relative weight a court will give to each factor will usually
depend upon the facts of the particular case in suit.
Subsequent to the Wands case, the court in In re Wright,
999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993), dealt with enablement issues
concerning vaccine claims in the animal health ﬁeld. In order
of expanding scope, the claims at issue in Wright were
directed to vaccines against the speciﬁc Prague Avian
Sarcoma Virus (PrASV) in chickens; vaccines against all
avian RNA viruses; and vaccines against all RNA viruses.
However, the patent application gave only “a single working
example” of a vaccine (speciﬁcally, a vaccine against PrASV
in chickens). The court held that the narrower claims directed
to vaccines against the speciﬁc chicken virus were allowable,
but the court also held that the claims drawn to vaccines
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directed to any and all RNA viruses, were not enabled. The
court cited examples such as the general difﬁculty in developing
RNAvirus vaccines (such as AIDS vaccines) and reasoned that
one working example was simply insufﬁcient given the lack of
predictability due to the mutation and diversity of these RNA
viruses. Moreover, the court noted there was nothing in the
record to establish that an immune response caused by an
antigenic envelope protein would have been sufﬁcient to rise to
the level of an “immunoprotective” response (9).
The patent applicants in In re Wright could have
improved their chances of obtaining broader claim scope if
they had more working examples, especially in multiple
species. Even if broad claims to “all RNA viruses” might
not have been realistic, additional working examples in a
variety of avian species could possibly have led to a “genus”
claim drawn to vaccines against a broader group of RNAviruses
(e.g., vaccines against a genus of RNA viruses in poultry). Here
we see a potential example of how the animal health ﬁeld might
uniquely lend itself to interesting opportunities for obtaining
“genus” claims within a given grouping of animals.
The “Written Description” Requirement under 35 USC
Section 112
In the areas of biotechnology and the life sciences, one of
the landmark cases regarding the written description require-
ment is Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d 1559
(Fed. Cir. 1997). In that case, the University presented claims
covering the entire genus of “vertebrate” cDNAs encoding
insulin (in addition to claims drawn to “mammalian insulin
cDNA” and narrower claims drawn speciﬁcally to “human
insulin DNA”). However, the University’s patent application
disclosed only rat cDNA, along with the amino acid sequence
for human insulin, and a method for isolating human DNA
using the rat sequence. In ruling that the University’s claims
failed to meet the written description requirement and were
therefore unpatentable, the court stated that a “description of
rat insulin cDNA is not a description of the broad classes of
vertebrate or mammalian insulin cDNA,”(10) Citing Fiers v.
Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993), the court
reiterated its belief that claims to a cDNA require “a kind
of speciﬁcity usually achieved by means of the recitation of
the sequence of nucleotides that make up the DNA” (11).
The rationale of the Lilly case was subsequently incorpo-
rated into Guideline No. 17 of the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Ofﬁce’s Synopsis of Application of Written Description Guide-
lines (12). Guideline No. 17 (which could be of particular
relevance with regard to “cross-species” issues in ﬁeld of
veterinary medicine) indicates that an example based on a lone
species (rat cDNA) which was “not representative” of the
claimed genus (mammalian cDNA) would not be sufﬁcient to
meet the §112 written description requirement.
A different result, however, was reached in the case of
Amgen v. Hoechst, 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003), where the
technical subject matter involved host cells rather than cDNAs.
In this case, Amgen had claims broadly directed to “verte-
brate” host cells and “mammalian” host cells, but Amgen’s
examples were limited to monkey cells and Chinese hamster
ovary cells. Nevertheless, the court held that since host cells are
very different from cDNA (in terms of readily conveying
distinguishing information concerning identity), Amgen’s dis-
closure satisﬁed the written description test because one skilled
in the art could easily recognize the identity of the members of
the claimed genus (13). Furthermore, when it came to the
enablement requirement, the court relied primarily on expert
t e s t i m o n yi nr u l i n gt h a tA m g e n ’s broad claims to “vertebrate”
and “mammalian” host cells were sufﬁciently enabled by
disclosure of just the two species of mammalian cells (14).
Turning to antibody technology, the patent application in
the case of Noelle v. Lederman, 355 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004),
had claims drawn to human CD40CR antibodies and mamma-
lian CD40CR antibodies, but the original disclosure only
described and claimed mouse CD40CR antibodies. Here, the
court applied the standard set in Lilly and ruled that patent
applicant’ss p e c i ﬁc, narrow disclosure of mouse antigen was
not sufﬁcient to support a patent claim for a more generic
scope of coverage for CD40CR antibodies (especially when it
comes to other species). The court held that antibody claims
must be fully characterized for there to be proper written
description, noting that “as long as applicant has disclosed a
fully characterized antigen, either by its structure, formula,
chemical name, or physical properties, or by deposit of the
antibody in a public depository, the applicant can then claim an
antibody by its binding afﬁnity to that described antigen” (15).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
OF OBVIOUSNESS THAT COULD IMPACT
PATENTING IN THE FIELD OF VETERINARY
MEDICINE
Background on the Development of the Law Pertaining
to Obviousness
In the U.S., the law pertaining to obviousness is codiﬁed
in 35 U.S.C. § 103, which provides in pertinent part:
A patent may not be obtained… if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and
the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art…
I nt h ec a s eo fGraham v John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966), the
U.S. Supreme Court set out the following three steps for
assessing whether the subject matter of a patent claim is obvious:
& Determine the scope and content of the prior art,
& Ascertain the differences between the prior art and
claims at issue, and
& Assess the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
Beyond this basic three-step test, the Supreme Court also
noted that, where relevant, secondary considerations such as
the following could also be used:
& Commercial success of the invention,
& Long felt but unsolved need for the present invention,
and
& The failure of others.
Graham v Deere remained the seminal case on obvious-
ness throughout the four decades since its issuance. In recent
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Federal Circuit (the main appeals court in patent cases) was
interpreting the Graham v Deere test in a way that unfairly
raised the bar for parties trying to invalidate patents. In
particular, the Federal Circuit Court was criticized for rigidly
requiring parties to demonstrate a speciﬁc “teaching, sugges-
tion, or motivation” to combine references when alleging
obviousness (a test often referred to as the “TSM” test).
TheissueoftheTSMtestwasﬁnallyarguedattheSupreme
Court on November 28, 2006, in the much-anticipated case of
KSR International v. Teleflex (16). In KSR, the question before
the Supreme Court was whether a claimed invention can be
obvious, and therefore unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. 103(a),
without proof of some “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” to
modify or combine the prior art in the manner claimed. KSR
(the accused infringer) argued that the claimed invention of the
patent in suit (the combination of a known adjustable gas pedal
with a known electronic throttle control) merely represented
an obvious combination of existing devices. In response, the
party asserting the patent (Teleﬂex) argued that the Federal
Circuit case law pertaining to obviousness required a party to
demonstrate a speciﬁc teaching, suggestion or motivation to
combine reference teachings, and in this case there was no
evidence of a speciﬁc teaching, suggestion or motivation to
combine the known gas pedal with the known electronic
control.
On April 30, 2007, the Supreme Court issued its decision
reversing the Federal Circuit’s “rigid” approach and ﬁnding
that the claimed combination was obvious. Noting that courts
should be free to take account of the “inferences and creative
steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ,”
the Supreme Court held that the analysis of obviousness
“need not seek out precise teachings directed to the speciﬁc
subject matter of the challenged claim” (17). In reaching its
decision, the Supreme Court pointed out that courts do not
have to ignore common sense, observing that “familiar items
may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in
many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to ﬁt the
teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle”
(18).
At the same time, the Court was cognizant that patent
examiners and other parties asserting obviousness of a
claimed invention should not be allowed to use hindsight to
link two distant references together without any reasonable
basis to do so. Accordingly, the Court cautioned that
assertions of obviousness “cannot be sustained by mere
conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulat-
ed reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the
legal conclusion of obviousness”. See KSR International Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn,
441 F. 3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
On May 3, 2007, three days after the KSR decision, the
Deputy Commissioner for Patent Operations at the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Ofﬁce (USPTO) issued an interim
statement noting, inter alia, that:
& “T h eS u p r e m eC o u r ti nKSR did not totally reject the
use of ‘teaching, suggestion, or motivation’ as a factor in
the obviousness analysis. Rather, the Court recognized
t h a tas h o w i n go f‘teaching, suggestion, or motivation’
to combine the prior art to meet the claimed subject
matter could provide a helpful insight in determining
whether the claimed subject matter is obvious” (19).
& “The Court rejected a rigid application of the ‘teach-
ing, suggestion, or motivation’ (TSM) test” (19).
& “The Court noted that the analysis supporting a
rejection under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) should be made
explicit, and that it was ‘important to identify a reason
that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in
the relevant ﬁeld to combine the (prior art) elements’
in the manner claimed” (19).
In view of this last point, the Deputy Commissioner’s interim
statement concluded that:
“in formulating a rejection under 35 U.S.C. §103(a)
based upon a combination of prior art elements, it
remains necessary for patent examiners to identify the
reason why a person of ordinary skill in the art would
have combined the prior art elements in the manner
claimed” (19).
Although the technology at issue in the KSR case related to
the design of auto parts, the Supreme Court’s ruling on the issue
of obviousness is expected to shape the future of patenting in the
life sciences. In particular, one can anticipate that it will be now
become easier to argue that a patent claim is obvious. Further-
more, to rebut a “prima facie” case of obviousness, patent
applicantsinthefuturewilllikelyhavetomeetahigherstandard
of proof and likely need to rely on strong evidence, such as:
1. Test data or other tangible evidence showing unex-
pectedly improved properties;
2. Test data or other tangible evidence showing that the
claimed invention has unforeseeable properties not
found in the prior art;
3. Arguments or evidence that the prior art shows a bias
against trying the newly claimed combination.
In Europe, where “obviousness” is known as “lack of
inventive step” under the European Patent Convention
(EPC), the case law has undergone its own unique evolution
with respect to how the issue is analyzed. In general, the
evaluation of “inventive step” in Europe starts with the
identiﬁcation of the “closest prior art” and the “technical
problem to be solved”. This is then followed by an analysis of
whether the technical solution to the problem represents an
unexpected or “non-obvious” advance over the “closest prior
art” (when combined with either a second prior art reference
or common general knowledge in the relevant art). A
thorough review of the European case law on inventive step
can be found in Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the
European Patent Office, pp. 120–168 (5th Ed. 2006) (20). With
particular regard to the life sciences, it is worth noting cases
such as Modifying Plant Cells/MYCOGEN (T 694/92; OJ EPO
1997, 408), Vaccines/GENENTECH (T 187/93; 1997), and
Triazole/ AGREVO (T 939/92 OJ EPO 1996/309), where there
is an interesting interplay between the “inventive step”
requirement of Article 56 EPC and the “sufﬁciency of
disclosure” requirement of Article 83 EPC. In particular, these
cases show that it has been the practice of the European Patent
Ofﬁce, under the so-called “problem and solution” approach,
to evaluate whether or not the problem in a given case has
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limit a patent proprietor’s claims to a scope commensurate
with the proprietor’s actual contribution to the art.
Examples of Special Situations in the Field of Veterinary
Medicine Where the Issue of Obviousness Could Come
Into Play
When evaluating obviousness under the patent laws, some
of the more interesting situations that could arise in the
veterinary ﬁeld are ones involving “cross-species” scenarios.
These are situations where the therapeutic use of a given active
ingredient or class of active ingredients is already known in one
animal species, and the new invention will use the same active
ingredient(ora memberofthe knownclassofactive ingredients)
in a second animal species (e.g., a situation where it is known to
use Drug X in a dog and the claimed invention is to use the
same Drug X in a cat; or a situation where it is known to use a
speciﬁc class of drugs in humans and the claimed invention is to
use a particular member of this class of drugs in an animal).
In situations such as these, the most favorable scenario
for the patent applicant is where the prior art publications
teach, or at least suggest, an actual bias against using the
therapeutic in the newly claimed species of animal. A
hypothetical example of this scenario would be as follows:
1. The prior art shows that a certain class of compounds
can be used successfully in dogs, but several com-
pounds within this class have previously been shown
not to work in cats (or better yet for the patent
applicant, were toxic in cats), and
2. The new invention is the paradoxical ﬁnding that a
novelcompoundwithintheknownclass of compounds
turns out to be perfectly safe and effective in cats.
This type of favorable prior art landscape is sometimes
referred to among patent practitioners as a “teaching away”
or a “prejudice” in the art and will usually be the easiest
argument to make if a patent applicant is fortunate enough to
have such a favorable prior art landscape as the backdrop for
the newly claimed invention (in this case, a novel compound
with surprising properties).
The moredifﬁcult situation iswhere theprior art showsuse
of a compound or class of compounds in multiple species of
animalsandthenewinventionisinaspeciesofanimalwherethe
drugorclassofdrugshasnotyetbeentried.Insituationssuchas
these, the patent applicant should attempt to identify a reason
why there might be a bias not to use the drug in the new species.
To support such an argument, the applicant should show
(preferably through the use of strong data) that the claimed
invention yields surprisingor unexpectedly superior results such
that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time would not have
had a reasonable expectation of such success in the new animal
species.
For examples of “cross-species” scenarios, reference can
be made to U.S. Patent No. 6,716,423 and U.S. Patent No.
5,750,112. U.S. Patent 6,716,423 relates to methods of
vaccinating a cow against a particular pathogen, Neospora,
which was ﬁrst isolated and identiﬁed in dogs, while U.S.
Patent 5,750,112 relates to a canine coronavirus vaccine
employing a feline enteric coronavirus. In the case of U.S.
Patent 5,750,112, there was prior art showing that cross-
protective studies with feline enteric coronavirus offered little
protection in certain heterologous species (e.g., in pigs), thus
providing a bias in the prior art against cross-species efﬁcacy.
Among other things, the patent applicant argued that the art
of developing vaccines to prevent canine corona virus
infections in dogs was unpredictable based on the antigenical
relationship of the coronaviradae viruses.
POTENTIAL ISSUES RELATED TO PATENTS
COVERING ASSAYS
An interesting issue with potential application to the
veterinary medicine ﬁeld concerns the question of patents in
the area of assays for analyzing the effects of drugs.
In the U.S. and many other countries in the world, it is
well established that assays and methods of carrying out
assays can properly be the subject matter of patents (provided
all the standard criteria of patentability are met). Thus, in a
situation where a patentee has been granted claims covering
an assay which is required by a regulatory agency to be used
in connection with the administration of a given therapy, a
question could arise as to what kind of remedies—such as lost
proﬁts, reasonable royalties, injunctive relief, etc.—the pat-
entee could be entitled to receive if the claimed assay is
indeed carried out by other parties in order to comply with
regulatory requirements.
With regard to clinical testing during the drug approval
process, there is often a valid exception to infringement under
Section 271(e)(1) of the U.S. Patent Statute (21). Section 271
(e)(1) provides a “safe harbor” exemption from patent
infringement for “uses reasonably related to the development
and submission of information under a Federal law which
regulates...drugs or veterinary biological products,” and this
special exemption has been given a fairly broad interpretation
under recent case law.(22) However, once a party commerci-
alizes a therapeutic, that party can no longer use the Section
271(e)(1) exemption as a defense. It also would not be a
defense simply to say that it is the clinician or veterinarian
who is the infringer and not the company that supplies the
therapeutic product. This is because the company selling the
product commercially could be accused of inducing infringe-
ment under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) or contributing to infringe-
ment under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). Although it is beyond the
scope of this article to speculate on how all this might be
played out in court and what remedies might or might not be
available, there are some court cases that may be of interest
in this analysis. See, e.g., Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Laborato-
ries, 849 F. 2d. 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988), where the defendant’s
infringing cancer and hepatitis test kits were not included in
the preliminary injunction order against the defendant since
the patentee did not offer such kits and there were no other
suppliers at the time. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has
recently issued a landmark decision on remedies in patent
infringement cases, ruling there is no longer a “general rule”
in patent cases that courts will almost always issue permanent
injunctions against infringement. Speciﬁcally, in eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C, 547 U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006), the
Supreme Court held that in patent cases, like all other types
of cases, permanent injunctions can only be issued where the
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means that the remedy must be assessed under the well-
established four-factor test used in all other cases, whereby a
plaintiff/patentee seeking a permanent injunction is required
to show that:
1. The patentee will suffer irreparable harm,
2. Standard legal remedies such as monetary damages
are inadequate to compensate for the injury,
3. A permanent injunction is warranted in view of the
balance of hardships (between patentee and infringer),
and
4. A permanent injunction would not be against the
public interest.
Thus, with particular regard to the fourth factor, the more
anaccusedinfringercanarguethatinjunctivereliefisagainstthe
publicinterest(e.g., the accused product is a lifesaving cure that
is not available from any other source), the greater chance
there is under the new case law that a judge might refuse to
order an injunction (despite infringement of a valid patent).
Within the ﬁeld of veterinary pharmaceuticals, this issue
has a unique twist. When a drug is approved for use in food-
producing animals, residue limits and withdrawal times are
established to ensure the safety of the animal-derived food
(e.g., eggs, milk, and meat) for human consumption. The
component of the application that establishes human food
safety must contain an analytical method that has been
properly validated. The performance characteristics of that
method are then integrated into the establishment of a
withdrawal time (i.e., the time between the last dose and when
the animal-derived food product is considered to be safe for
human consumption). Interestingly, although the analytical
method would be considered as part of the product dossier, the
analytical method becomes an integral component of the drug
monitoring program and must be the method used by any
laboratory involved in the monitoring of food for “violative
residues”. Furthermore, in legal proceedings in the U.S.
associated with prosecuting parties for marketing drug-tainted
food, data generated using the FDA-approved analytical
method are relied upon to support the prosecutions (23,24).
SITUATIONS WHERE THERE ARE ACTUAL
DIFFERENCES IN THE LAW IN THE CASE
OF VETERINARY MEDICINE
In research compiled for this article, very few examples
have been uncovered where there are actual differences in the
law per se when it comes to the veterinary ﬁeld. Perhaps the
most interesting examples can be found in the area of U.S.
law pertaining to patent term restoration and the interplay of
this area of patent law with U.S. regulatory law as embodied
in the so-called “Hatch–Waxman Act” (in the ﬁeld of human
medicine) and the Generic Animal Drug and Patent Term
Restoration Act (in the ﬁeld of veterinary medicine).
Overview of the Hatch–Waxman Act and the Generic
Animal Drug and Patent Term Restoration Act (GADPTR)
The original Hatch–Waxman legislation was passed in
1984 as a compromise between pioneer pharmaceutical
companies and generic companies. The pioneer companies
were concerned that they were spending enormous sums of
money to develop each new drug, yet the duration of time
from drug discovery to commercialization was often more than
10 years—thereby eroding valuable patent term. The generic
companies, on the other hand, argued that they could not get
on the market until years after the patent expiration. This was
because of the famous 1984 case, Roche v. Bolar, 733 F.2d 858
(Fed. Cir. 1984), which held that testing and development in
pursuit of regulatory approval constituted infringement even
though the generic company was willing to wait for the patent
to expire before commercializing the product.
These developments provided the foundation for the
Hatch–Waxman legislation, whereby generic companies were
given the beneﬁt of earlier entry possibilities in exchange for
pioneer companies being able to retrieve, to a limited extent,
some of the lost years of valuable patent life that were unused
due to the regulatory approval process.
In 1988, the Hatch–Waxman legal framework was, for the
most part, extended to the ﬁeld of veterinary medicine through
enactment of the Generic Animal Drug and Patent Term
Restoration Act (GADPTR) (25). Like Hatch–Waxman on the
human side, the GADPTR gave generic companies the beneﬁt
of earlier entry possibilities in exchange for pioneer companies
being able to retrieve some of the lost years of valuable patent
life that were unused due to the regulatory approval process.
However, there are a few signiﬁcant differences between the
statutory provisions on the human side and the statutory
provisions on the veterinary side (as discussed below):
Statutory Differences Under the Generic Animal Drug
and Patent Term Restoration Act
The Option for a Patentee in the Animal Health Field to Take
its Patent Term Extension for a Food-Producing Animal
Indication Even if a Companion Animal Indication
is Approved First
The patent term restoration statute makes clear that a
patent can only be extended once—and, generally, only for
the ﬁrst approved use (26). However, this would present a
potential dilemma for an animal health company seeking
regulatory approval in both companion animals and food–
producing animals in cases where the company obtains its first
approval for a companion animal indication while a much
more lucrative indication for food-producing animals is still
pending (e.g., a company’s new antibiotic is approved for
dogs before it is approved for cows). To remove this potential
dilemma, there is a unique provision in the patent term
restoration statute that provides a patentee in the animal
health area the important option of actually deferring its one-
time opportunity for patent term extension until its approval
for the food-producing animal indication comes through. This
represents a very unusual statutory exception to the general
rule that a patent can only be extended for the ﬁrst approval.
No such exceptions exist for human therapeutics.
Genetically Engineered Animal Drugs are Expressly Excluded
from Patent Term Restoration under GADPTR
Unlike the relatively broader opportunities for patent
term restoration in the case of human therapeutics, the law in
6 Gouldthe animal health area expressly excludes patentees from
obtaining patent term restoration for genetically engineered
animal drugs (i.e., drugs that were “primarily manufactured
using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma
technology, or other processes involving site-speciﬁc genetic
manipulation techniques”)( 25). There is no such exclusion in
the case of human therapeutics.
Genetically Engineered Animal Drugs are Expressly Excluded
from the “Safe Harbor” Provisions in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)
The “safe harbor” exemptions from patent infringement
providedin35U.S.C.§271(e)(1)for“usesreasonablyrelatedto
thedevelopmentandsubmissionofinformationunderaFederal
law which regulates...drugs or veterinary biological products”
applies for both human and animal drugs. However, unlike
human drugs, animal drugs or veterinary biologics are expressly
excluded from the safe harbor if they were “primarily
manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA,
hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site-
speciﬁc genetic manipulation techniques”.
Obtaining One Patent Extension for an Active Ingredient
in a Human Indication and then Obtaining a Second Patent
Extension for the Same Active Ingredient in an Animal
Indication
A question sometimes arises as to whether a “second
patent term restoration” is possible for an animal health
approval when the same active ingredient has already been
extended for a human therapeutic product. In general, the
patent term restoration statute contains strong prohibitions
against obtaining a second patent term restoration for the
same active ingredient (26). However, if one reads carefully
through all the statutory prohibitions, the possibility for the
following special scenario can be seen: Assume that a
company has two patents: Patent A covering the use of
Compound X in a human indication (as approved under
Section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(“FDCA”)) and Patent B covering use of the same Com-
pound X in an animal indication (as approved under Section
512 of the FDCA). Then, in this particular situation
(assuming all the other conditions are met), the company
can obtain one extension—on Patent A—based on the human
indication, plus an additional extension—on Patent B—based
on the veterinary indication. Key to this scenario, of course, is
the assumption that Patent A does not extend in scope to
cover the veterinary use and Patent B does not extend in
scope to cover the human use.
Other Statutory Differences Between Laws Applying
to Human Products and Laws Applying to Veterinary
Products
No “Pediatric Exclusivity” for Animal Drugs
In the U.S., human drugs meeting certain speciﬁed
requirements involving additional testing for pediatric use
can qualify for an extra six months exclusivity (in addition to
all other applicable exclusivity periods) (27), but there is no
corresponding “pediatric exclusivity” for animal drugs.
Orphan Drug Status for Human Drugs vs. “MUMS” Status
for Animal Drugs
In the U.S., human drugs meeting all the requisite
conditions (e.g., rare diseases affecting fewer then 200,000
patients) can obtain a so-called “Orphan Drug” designation”
under the Orphan Drug Act (28), whereby the holder is
entitled to several speciﬁed beneﬁts such as the possibility for
tax credits and seven years of exclusivity with respect to the
speciﬁed orphan indication. The Orphan Drug Act does not
extend to animal drugs. However, animal drugs meeting
certain criteria have the possibility to obtain a so-called Minor
Use/Minor Species (MUMS) designation for qualiﬁed “minor
species” (e.g., goats, sheep, ﬁsh, etc.) or for uncommon
“minor uses” in the major animal groups (cattle, cats, dogs,
swine, poultry, etc.). The MUMS designation also provides
seven years of marketing exclusivity for that indication (29),
but does not provide the basis for patent extensions or tax
credits.
Pharmaceutical Patent “Springboarding” in Australia
Australian law provides a special “springboarding” safe
harbor exemption from patent infringement whereby clinical
testing of a human pharmaceutical product by an unlicensed
party is permitted—during the term of the relevant patent—
for the purpose of obtaining regulatory approval of a generic
version of the patented product. However, unlike the
provisions for clinical trials in the U.S. and Europe where
most veterinary products enjoy safe harbors relatively similar
to those enjoyed by human products, this particular “spring-
boarding” safe harbor in Australia does not apply to
pharmaceuticals in the veterinary ﬁeld and thus represents a
stark example of where the law for veterinary pharmaceut-
icals differs from the law for human pharmaceuticals.
CONCLUSION
The author continues to search for examples where
provisions in a nation’s patent laws might have unique
application in the case of veterinary medicine and would
welcome learning of further examples that readers may have
encountered. Readers may also want to take a closer look at
the areas of law where the human and veterinary ﬁelds
diverge and consider whether the divergence is justiﬁed in
each case.
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